As of October 2024, the Kurdish issue in Turkey has entered a new phase. The defining feature of this phase is that, although framed by the rhetoric of “peace,” it does not represent a desire for a democratic solution; rather, it represents a comprehensive management strategy that aims to weaken the presence of Kurds in neighboring countries where they exist, while controlled integration of Kurdish political, military, and social power within the country into the system.
Political Risk Analysis
The statement made by MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli at the Turkish Grand National Assembly group meeting on October 22, 2024, marks the symbolic starting point of this process.Bahçeli stated that the process would officially begin if Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, dissolved his organization and called for the laying down of arms; he explicitly defined this initiative not as a political negotiation but as a “project carried out with the mind of the state.” From that moment on, the concept of a “Turkey without terrorism” became central to political discourse and signaled that the Kurdish issue would be addressed not as a matter of resolution but of termination.
The DEM Party, on the other hand, deliberately avoided giving the process an official name, defining it as an “opportunity for peace and democratic reform” and emphasizing that Turkey was at an important turning point in the Kurdish issue. However, the picture that has emerged over time shows that the real aim of the process is not peace, but rather to bring the accumulated military, political, and social power of the Kurds under control. Although the language has softened, the number of actors has increased, and the framework of international legitimacy has strengthened, the essence has not changed: what is at stake here is not a peace process, but a realignment of power balances.
Öcalan’s move: A search for peace or a power break?
Dr. Ahmet Cavuldak, Political Scientist at Humboldt University:
“Öcalan’s peace move is a historic opportunity but also a major risk.”
Dr. Ahmet Cavuldak, a political scientist living in Berlin, interprets the PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan’s initiation of the peace process as a strategic move aimed at preserving the political and military power that the Kurds have gained, particularly in Rojava.
According to Cavuldak, this process is not merely a search for peace; it signals a new threshold of consciousness in the military, economic, and political spheres.
“We are talking about a convergence of three separate dimensions of power—military, economic, and political. Öcalan is concerned to the extent that he has recognized this,” says Cavuldak, emphasizing that he anticipates the Republic of Turkey will not accept this accumulation of power.
“Öcalan advocates an idea of coexistence based on the ‘law of democratic brotherhood’ that transcends antagonism, precisely because he sees that external actors such as the US and Israel could use the Kurds as pawns for their own interests.”
Cavuldak emphasizes that this vision is not merely a conjunctural investment; on the contrary, it has its roots in the depths of the history of both societies.
Bahçeli’s “soft approach”
Dr. Cavuldak notes that the process is progressing on a mutual basis and evaluates Devlet Bahçeli’s stance within this framework:
“In Bahçeli’s approach, rather than peace, the reflex to see the accumulated power of the Kurds as a threat to the Turkish state comes to the fore. The aim is to control this power through the rhetoric of peace and gradually dissipate it.”
Cavuldak sees Bahçeli’s constant emphasis on “terrorism” as a reflection of his reductionist approach to the Kurdish issue and states that a genuine will for peace must permeate society. “If the state and those who govern it were sincere about peace and democracy, this will would also be reflected in civil society,” he says.
The focus is not on Turkey, but on Rojava
According to Cavuldak, there is no comprehensive peace agenda for Kurds in Turkey; the real focus is on Rojava.
“In the previous resolution process, there was a wave of peace spreading throughout society; there were noteworthy attempts at confrontation and reconciliation in some places. Today, there is no trace of this. When the Turkish state saw that the Kurds in Rojava had become a powerful actor with US support, it pulled the ‘handbrake’ on the locomotive of history, so to speak.”
Emphasizing that the accumulated consciousness and power have brought the divided Kurdish society to the brink of statehood, Cavuldak says that this historical situation is not only an opportunity for the Kurds, but also poses serious dangers. Evaluating Öcalan’s statement as a warning that the Kurds face a great risk both in Turkey and in Rojava, Cavuldak says that otherwise, everyone will suffer heavy losses and the right to live together will be seriously undermined.
Historical opportunity, historical risk
Cavuldak states that Öcalan is trying to use his political influence in favor of the Kurds despite limited conditions, calling it a “soft transition” strategy:
“This is a great historical opportunity, but also a great danger. Because in history, Kurdish national consciousness has never developed this much in all four parts at the same time.”
Cavuldak points out that Turkey’s geopolitical position, the war in Ukraine, and the balance of power within NATO have strengthened Ankara’s hand, arguing that Europe has largely pushed democracy and human rights into the background in this process:
“Europe’s priority is the refugee issue. For this reason, Europe, especially Germany, is deeply tied to the Erdogan administration.” Cavuldak also notes that the harsh winds blowing from Trump’s authoritarian-style US and Putin’s Russia, which sees war as a normal extension of politics, are forcing Europe into a simpler power balance and interest-based politics.
The US, Israel, and the Kurds
Cavuldak is cautious when discussing whether the US has a clear plan in Syria, but he says it is clear that Israel wants to use the Kurdish presence as a counterbalance to Iran and Turkey.
At this point, he issues an important warning to the Kurds:
“The Kurds must be able to negotiate with all parties in line with their own interests. Realpolitik demands this. Indeed, all nations—including Turkey—behave this way. They should not limit their options from the outset with idealistic rhetoric and ideological frameworks. A pragmatic policy aimed at increasing power in all areas of life should be pursued.”
Cavuldak, who views Mazlum Abdi’s realist approach positively from this perspective, emphasizes that the relations established with Barzani constitute an important advantage for the Kurds.
Cavuldak states that Öcalan’s influence over the Kurdish base is still very strong, adding that, whether accepted or not, Öcalan is the only interlocutor for the PKK, which has decided to dissolve.
Cavuldak states that even Bahçeli has effectively accepted Öcalan’s leadership, describing this as “the irony of history.” From the state’s perspective, he says that a “restrained” Öcalan is seen as a political reserve that can guide the Kurdish base.
The suppression of civil society
Dr. Cavuldak also emphasizes that the leader-centered structure in Kurdish politics overshadows civil society:
“Öcalan’s influence limits the expression of politics and civil society. In Kurdish society, the freedom to generate original ideas and express criticism in the public sphere seems to be besieged on all sides; thinking and speaking is like walking on a minefield. This situation is extremely detrimental to the development of collective intelligence in society.”
Cavuldak points out that the suppression of criticism in war environments is a universal problem, citing Russia, Ukraine, and Israel as examples:
“When the ground for sincere and constructive criticism disappears, society suffocates and decays.”
Cavuldak states that the emerging Kurdish consciousness in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey is historically the strongest source of hope for the Kurds, expressing his optimism with the following words:
“Where there is consciousness, power accumulates. The Kurds have never had such a strong sense of shared destiny in their history.”
Finally, touching on the issue of identity and national consciousness, Cavuldak states that ethnic identity or national consciousness cannot be denied in the modern world; indeed, it is one of the most defining elements of human life. However, he emphasizes that in order for this not to become a trap, it must be reconciled with universal values. Noting that Öcalan consciously avoids the discourse of “state,” he concludes his remarks as follows:
“Öcalan knows that the moment he says ‘state,’ he will become a target; he understands the mental background of Turkish society, its fears and paranoia. For this reason, he emphasizes the idea of a democratic destiny shared by all.”
Pencweni’s Testimony: Behind the Scenes of the Process
Muhammed Emin Pencweni, an experienced Kurdish politician from the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (IKRG), sheds light on the background of the process in an interview with Rûdaw TV in August 2025. According to Pencweni, the sticking point in the previous resolution process was a deep conflict over Öcalan’s role. This impasse was overcome by the visit of Nechirvan Barzani, then President of the KRG, to Ankara.
In the current process, direct channels have been established between Kandil and Ankara, and negotiations are being conducted under the coordination of the MIT and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Disarmament steps are presented not as a bargaining chip, but as a natural and symbolic part of the process.
DEM Party and Bakırhan: Civil Politics
DEM Party Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan outlines the limits of the process within the framework of “civil politics.” Bakırhan clearly states that he is not demanding autonomy, federation, or constitutional guarantees, defining his goal as “local democracy” and “equal citizenship.”
This discourse deepens the crisis of representation in the Kurdish public sphere. The Ankara-centered execution of the process and the constant lowering of demands impose a controlled integration line rather than strengthening civil politics.
Sociological Break: Generational Change
The most critical factor distinguishing the current process from previous periods is that Kurdish society has undergone a profound sociological transformation. Kurds no longer base their politics solely on a suppressed identity; we are now dealing with an urbanized, educated, digitally connected, multi-centered, and multi-layered structure.
The new generation does not identify as strongly with the political vision based on charismatic leadership shaped around armed struggle as previous generations did. This coincides with Max Weber’s process of charismatic authority evolving into rational-bureaucratic structures: charisma is still a reference point, but it is gradually losing its decisiveness.
The Demirtaş Factor: Alternative Legitimacy
Selahattin Demirtaş’s imprisonment is the most striking indicator of the transformation in Kurdish politics. Demirtaş is a symbol of politics based on pluralism, civil society, and political communication rather than charismatic leadership. For the new generation of Kurds, Demirtaş stands out not as a symbol of armed struggle, but as a symbol of political representation, freedom of expression, and democratic demands.
His detention is not merely a violation of individual rights, but also indicative of the state’s structural concern about this shift in Kurdish politics. This is because Demirtaş’s line creates a political space that is unpredictable and difficult to control in terms of controlled integration strategies.
Following developments in Syria, Bahçeli’s statement that “our decision is clear until Öcalan returns to hope and Demirtaş returns to his home” clearly reveals the axis of the preferred political line and legitimacy design.
The Erosion of Öcalan Centrism
Although Öcalan continues to be a historical and symbolic reference point in the Kurdish political movement, his social influence has diminished compared to the past. This limitation stems not only from state policies but also from the political expectations of the younger generation.
The state’s efforts to return Öcalan to the center of the process are, paradoxically, hindering the transformation in Kurdish politics. The continuation of charismatic leadership has become a balancing mechanism that blocks the emergence of new and autonomous political actors.
Mehmet Uçum and the State’s Open Language
In an article published in AA, Presidential Chief Advisor Mehmet Uçum lays out the state’s approach to the Kurdish issue stripped of ideological veils. This approach is shaped around the axes of “one nation,” “one border,” and “absolute integration,” positioning Kurds not as a political subject but as a community to be governed.
In Uçum’s language, democracy, pluralism, and political representation become secondary, while “the borders drawn by the state,” “obedience,” and “integration” are the fundamental reference points. This language is a state language that imposes conformity and allegiance; Kurds are seen not as political subjects, but as a social element that can be included in the system only if they behave correctly within the defined boundaries.
Bahçeli: The Institutional Cement of Nationalism
Bahçeli’s discourse reinforces the political legitimacy of the process through nationalist reflexes. The emphasis on “this is a state project” relegates elected politics to second place and transfers decision-making processes to security thinking. It obscures the hard core of the process, reducing the conflict to a technical and administrative issue.
The process reflects the logic of a classic intelligence and security report: risk analysis, threat reduction, controllable actors, and crisis postponement. The Kurdish issue is not treated as an area for democratic resolution, but as a security dossier that must be managed and controlled.
The Fragility of Controlled Integration
Controlled integration may ensure short-term peace, but it lacks the capacity to produce a political solution. This is because integration is designed around obedience and conformity. When the Kurdish issue is addressed solely through security parameters, political demands can be suppressed but not eliminated.
While incorporating Kurds into the system, the state removes them from being political subjects and reduces them to an administrative category. This leads to the narrowing of the public sphere and the conversion of politics into administration.
Expectation–Reality Gap
For the new generation of Kurds, the issue is no longer just about recognition of identity; it is about demands for political representation, justice, freedom of expression, and equal citizenship. Controlled integration loses its legitimacy when it fails to meet these demands. The widening gap between expectation and reality leads to a silent but profound political rupture, and participation shifts from formal channels to informal spaces.
The Rojava experience offers Kurds a practical exercise in political subjectification. Even if possible normalization processes with Damascus aim to dismantle this structure, the historical experience and collective memory that have emerged cannot be erased. Turkey’s approach to the process solely through the lens of security increases the risk of a reductionist reading of regional dynamics.
Selahattin Demirtaş and the Democratic Alternative
Demirtaş has built legitimacy through the ballot box, speech, and political representation rather than armed struggle. The Demirtaş line is a greater and more unpredictable threat to controlled integration than . His imprisonment is more about limiting political possibilities than security.
Öcalan’s line points to negotiations with the past, while Demirtaş’s line points to confronting the future. As the state’s preference leans toward the former, the democratic transformation of Kurdish and Turkish politics in particular is being systematically postponed.
No Peace, Only Reckoning
The ultimate result of controlled integration is not a solution; it is a postponed and accumulated crisis. Although the state appears to be gaining in the short term, the cost of a political solution increases every year.
The process underway is not a solution aimed at producing peace; it is a management strategy that aims to integrate the historical and social power of the Kurds into the system in a controlled manner. For real peace, equal citizenship, genuine political representation, and a free public sphere are necessary.
The equation established today does not resolve the crisis; it merely manages it over time. History has repeatedly shown that postponed crises do not disappear; on the contrary, they deepen.
Gülbahar Altaş wrote for EUROPolitika (Insight).
