Tariffs Return: Von der Leyen’s Test in a Fractured Atlantic

Cansu Ece Gökşin


ANALYSIS

In June 2025, an old word returned to Brussels corridors with new weight: tariffs. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s campaign team issued a letter, first reported by POLITICO, warning that, if re-elected, a fresh round of duties would hit European steel, copper, and — crucially — cars (Herszenhorn & Barigazzi, 2025). For Germany, which exports roughly one in every seven cars across the Atlantic, the threat is more than symbolic. It cuts straight to the core of Europe’s export engine — and its longstanding belief that the Atlantic partnership is insurance against sudden shocks.

Europe has managed tariff threats before — the first metal levies in 2018, partial rollbacks under Biden, and quiet hopes that transatlantic trust could outlast politics. Nevertheless, this time, the stakes are sharper. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is now seeking a second term built on a simple promise: that Europe can remain open without staying naïve. Her language of “open strategic autonomy” signals a blunt shift — staying connected to Washington, but ready to stand alone when needed.

Trump’s letter — and its line to “protect American industry first” — underlines what EU capitals rarely say aloud: trust in the Atlantic economy is conditional, and easily shaken. Inside Germany, major industry groups — including the country’s powerful automotive lobby, the VDA — have quietly warned that retaliating in kind could backfire, hurting Europe’s exporters more than deterring Washington’s turn inward (Reuters, 2025a).

Goodbye, Trump, Hello Asia? Europe’s Hedge Under Pressure

Brussels’ fallback is not theoretical. When Trump’s first tariffs landed in 2018, the EU finalized the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) — still the world’s most significant open trade pact after Brexit (European Commission, 2024). It was an unspoken hedge: if the Atlantic door narrows, the Pacific one must stay open.

By 2025, this hedge has grown, but so have its limits. The EU’s Pacific Economic Partnership now pulls in smaller island states like Niue and Timor-Leste — tiny in population but critical for nickel, rare earths, and strategic shipping routes (European Commission, 2025). Sweden has pushed further, proposing that the EU explore an alignment with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) — the regional pact the U.S. exited under Trump’s first term (Reuters, 2025b).

As POLITICO puts it: “Goodbye Trump, Hello Asia” (Barigazzi & Herszenhorn, 2025). The European External Action Service (EEAS) frames it simply: “de-risking through diversification” (EEAS, 2025). Broaden your investment portfolio and distribute the associated risks. On paper, it works — if the Atlantic trembles, Asian supply chains absorb the shock.

Nevertheless, from Hamburg’s port to factory towns in Slovakia, the question is the same: will this plan hold up when the following tariff letter arrives? A fallback only works if it turns into ships, terminals, and real partnerships that last when old routes are blocked.

From Vision to Delivery: A Test of Resilience

Here, the gap shows. The European Policy Centre (2025) and Draghi (2024) both say it plainly: Europe is strong at drafting strategies, but struggles to finance and build them at the scale global competition demands.

The Global Gateway, Europe’s €300 billion answer to China’s Belt and Road, promises new green corridors and digital routes from Africa to Southeast Asia. But delivery drags. National budgets tangle, legal rules clash, and real construction lags behind headlines (BusinessEurope, 2025). Meanwhile, trillions sit in European pension funds, rarely invested in major overseas infrastructure, while Asian sovereign wealth prefers U.S. markets (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2025).

Von der Leyen’s idea of “open strategic autonomy” hinges on translating this concept into credible action quickly enough to prevent the next shock from exposing Europe. If the Atlantic sours again, the Indo-Pacific hedge must be more than polite words in a Council memo. Workers on factory floors and freight managers in Europe’s ports need to see real routes and real partners, not just reassurance at summits.

Summary

Donald Trump’s renewed tariff warning has landed just as Europe’s confidence in its Atlantic anchor is under strain. As POLITICO shows, new duties on steel, copper, and cars could hit just as Ursula von der Leyen seeks a second term built on “open strategic autonomy.” Brussels’ pivot — deeper ties from Japan to the CPTPP, island deals, the Global Gateway — signals that Europe understands what is at stake. Nevertheless, strategy is only real when it builds trust beyond the page: in new supply chains, shared ports, and partners that stay when the Atlantic wavers. If that trust stays abstract, the next tariff wave will show how far Europe still has to go to turn autonomy into something people can count on.

References

  1. BusinessEurope. (2025, March). Global Gateway: Europe’s Response to China’s Belt and Road. Retrieved from https://www.businesseurope.eu/publications/global-gateway-europes-response-chinas-belt-and-road
  2. Draghi, M. (2024). The Future of European Competitiveness: A Strategy for Europe. European Commission. Retrieved from https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en
  3. European Commission. (2024). EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: Five-Year Review. Directorate-General for Trade. Retrieved from https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/japan_en
  4. European Commission. (2025). Pacific EPA Extension: Policy Briefing. Directorate-General for Trade. Retrieved from https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/pacific_en
  5. European External Action Service. (2025, May). Indo-Pacific Strategy Progress Report. Retrieved from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/indo-pacific-strategy-update-2025_en
  6. European Policy Centre. (2025, July). From Mission Polity to Mission Economy: Making the EU a Strategic Investment Power. Retrieved from https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/From-mission-polity-to-mission-economy~6484fb
  7. Herszenhorn, D. M., & Barigazzi, J. (2025, June). EU Leaders Brace for Trump’s TariffsPOLITICO. Retrieved from https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-donald-trump-us-trade-tariffs-ursula-von-der-leyen/
  8. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2025). Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Trends 2025. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/finance/sovereign-wealth-funds-trends-2025.htm
  9. Reuters. (2025a, June). European Automakers Brace for Tariffs. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/european-car-makers-brace-trump-tariff-threat-2025-06-12/
  10. Reuters. (2025b, May). Sweden Floats EU Membership in Pacific Rim Trade Group. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/china/sweden-propose-eu-membership-pacific-rim-free-trade-group-cptpp-2025-05-13/
  11. Herszenhorn, D. M., & Barigazzi, J. (2025, June). Ursula von der Leyen at EU summit during tariff talks[Photograph]. POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-donald-trump-us-trade-tariffs-ursula-von-der-leyen/
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