Israel’s “Operation Rising Lion” attack on Iran on June 13, 2025, balanced the fragility of the Middle East, but what storms will arise in Syria’s new era? How will the secret diplomacy of Shara in Israel and Turkey, the Kurds’ aspirations for autonomy in Rojava, and sectarian tensions under the shadow of radical Islamist factions shape the region’s destiny? This first analysis report by EUROPolit and Insight’s Middle East Political Risk Expert Gülbahar Altaş pieces together the attack on Iran within the Syria-centric geopolitical landscape, guiding you through this complex chessboard!
A new era, a new equation in Syria
Since the civil war began in Syria in 2011, political, ethnic, and ideological fault lines have been constantly reshaped.
The collapse of the Assad regime, the PKK’s laying down of arms, Rojava’s reconciliation with Damascus, and the operations carried out in the Israel-Turkey intervention have made Syria the most fragile country in the Middle East in 2025, as well as a storage area. In the new equation, the Kurds are no longer just a local power, but one of the central actors in the geopolitical game. However, in their quest for legitimacy and status, they have not yet achieved lasting security.
From a stateless past to de facto self-government
For decades, Kurds in Syria lived as a stateless and rights-deprived community. In the 1962 census, thousands were stripped of their citizenship. Over time, the PKK found an opportunity to organize its Syrian branches; since the 1980s, the Assad regime has provided indirect support in this regard. In 2012, an autonomous self-governance system was established in the Rojava region, led by the PKK’s resistance group, the YPG, and later evolved into the SDG (Syrian Democratic Forces) with its multi-ethnic structure. The SDG took a prominent role on the ground as the ground force in the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism.
Rojava (northern Syria, a region dominated by Kurds), which developed a self-governance model based on gender equality, local councils, and radical democracy principles, was not officially recognized by either the Syrian regime or international actors. Turkey, however, has labeled this structure a “terrorist organization” due to its organic ties to the PKK and has intervened militarily in many areas of northern Syria.
The collapse of Assad and the new era: The Shar-Damascus regime
In December 2024, the Assad era came to an end with the capture of Aleppo and Damascus by Turkey-backed opposition forces. Ahmed al-Shara (Golani), who had previously been associated with Al-Qaeda but had since adopted a more political stance, was appointed interim president.
On March 10, 2025, the historic agreement signed between Shara and SDG leader Mazlum Abdi marked a turning point for Syria’s future. The agreement provides for the transfer of border crossings, airports, and energy fields in Rojava to the Damascus administration and recognizes Kurds as an “indivisible part” of Syria.
This development both accelerated Rojava’s quest for international legitimacy and reshaped the internal political map of Syria.
PKK’s disarmament: A new strategic ground
Following closed-door talks between Turkish officials and Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader announced on May 12, 2025, that the organization had ended its 40-year armed struggle and dissolved itself. This announcement caused widespread reaction in Turkey and around the world.
Ankara argues that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDG) should be integrated into the Syrian army in the new period. Within this framework, the process of integrating the SDG into the central authority, rather than maintaining its autonomous structure, has gained momentum on the ground. However, the Washington administration has not yet clarified its approach to this integration. The US and the coalition fighting ISIS, which have supported the SDF for years, are cautiously supporting the Damascus-SDF reconciliation on the one hand, while reassessing the future of their military presence in the region on the other. Trump’s representative in Syria, Barrack, stated that the number of bases in the country had been reduced from eight to three, with the goal being to have only one base. According to a report by Fox News television channel based on information from US officials, approximately 500 soldiers have been withdrawn in recent weeks and a large number of US bases have either been handed over to the SDF or closed.
Meanwhile, the Damascus government is preparing to end the activities of Palestinian-affiliated armed groups in the country in line with demands from Israel and the US. Under comprehensive security measures, all political, military, and economic activities have been banned, with the exception of educational and social activities. It has been reported that detailed lists of Palestinian militants will be requested, and those who fail to surrender their weapons will face investigation.
Israel-Syria talks brokered by Turkey
The timing of these harsh measures is directly linked to diplomatic maneuvers on the ground. According to Israeli media, backchannel talks are underway between Damascus and Tel Aviv, with Turkey acting as a mediator.
Damascus’ silent softening toward Israel
The Syrian regime’s move to begin controlling even some Palestinian groups that have remained loyal to it for years is seen as a sign of a strategic shift in line with Israel’s security demands. Israel is demanding that anti-Israel propaganda activities in Syrian territory be stopped, that anti-Israel content be removed from school curricula, and that armed Palestinian groups be completely dismantled.
In this process, Turkey is emerging as a reliable mediator for both Damascus and Tel Aviv, working to strengthen the ground for normalization based on stability in the region. These developments show that the Syrian crisis is not limited to the Kurdish issue, but has evolved into a new phase integrated into the Israeli-Palestinian equation.
When Turkey’s mediation role is combined with the US’s plans for reconstruction in northern Syria, it is noteworthy that the country is undergoing a fundamental change in both its security doctrine and diplomatic architecture.
The position of the Kurds in the international arena: Legal uncertainties
Dr. Kardo Rached, Head of the Turkey Desk at the Sibey Research Center based in Sulaymaniyah, drew attention to the de facto administration established by the Kurds in Syria after Assad and stated that the normalization process of the Damascus administration poses serious threats to Rojava.
According to Dr. Rached, the Kurds still lack a clear roadmap, and their gains could be jeopardized if external support is withdrawn. The Kurds are still recognized as a stateless people under international law. The legitimacy of structures such as the SDG is defined solely by temporary military and political needs. This makes Rojava’s future fragile.
“An opportunity for America, a threat for the Kurds”
According to Rached, the Shara administration’s desire to take over ISIS prisoners is of strategic importance to the US. However, this development poses a threat to Kurdish forces that have been fighting ISIS for a long time and paying a heavy price.
If the US turns to Shara on this issue, the Kurds may be forced to confront the Damascus government, even if they do not want to.
Rojava’s identity problem: The demand is not clear
Stating that the Kurds do not have state status under international law and are not recognized as a party to negotiations, Rached said that Rojava has not set a clear goal for either full autonomy or independence. “I still don’t know exactly what Rojava wants,” Rached said, warning that the Kurds would suffer if constitutional demands were not clearly defined.
“Israel has a plan, Turkey is playing strategically”
Dr. Kardo Rached emphasized that Israel is using Rojava as a tool for regional pressure and that the Turkey-Israel alliance is the biggest obstacle facing the Kurds.
“Turkey’s interests with Israel are greater than its interests with the Kurds,” said Rached, adding that Rojava is caught between regional powers.
“The YPG should not be forced into a military agreement before a political agreement.”
Dr. Rached said that the YPG should not resort to armed reconciliation without reaching a political agreement with the Damascus administration in the name of Kurdish national interests, adding that otherwise it would be a historic mistake. He stated that the PKK’s call for laying down arms should turn into a national gain in Rojava.
Dr. Rached said that Turkey continues to oppose the “self-administration” model in Rojava and that Turkey would be able to operate more freely in the region if the PKK disarmed. He emphasized that Turkey is trying to restrict the Kurds in Rojava through both diplomatic and military means.
Federal structure or independence?
According to Dr. Kardo Rached, although there are different views among the Kurds, full independence is not realistic under the current conditions. A federal structure is more likely. However, pointing out that this model must be guaranteed by the constitution, he said, “The Damascus administration will not make too many concessions. Regional balances also make it difficult for the Kurds to achieve their demands.”
In his assessment of the next five years, Dr. Kardo Rached emphasized that Syria will not be able to take major political steps and that the Kurds will need more external support than ever before, saying, “A political solution is as important as a military solution. A period of balance is coming. The Kurds need to be more careful in this process.”
Between uncertainty and transformation in Rojava
Ahmed el-Shara, one of the architects of the post-Assad era in Syria, has established a fragile balance through his delicate policy of balancing both radical Islamists and Kurds. However, the sustainability of this balance is questionable. The PKK’s disarmament and the agreements reached with the SDG are important steps toward the Kurds in the region gaining legitimacy. However, Dr. Kardo Rached’s analysis shows that Rojava’s future still largely depends on the will of regional and global actors.
Rojava is no longer just a Kurdish issue; it has become a strategic structure at the center of the plans of Israel, Turkey, Iran, Russia, and the US for Syria. In this chess game, the Kurds are no longer pawns; they are one of the actors who will determine the course of the game. However, it is still unclear in which direction they will move. Rojava’s fate depends not only on its own will but also on the reshaping geopolitics of the Middle East.
It will be difficult for Damascus to pursue a balance policy that satisfies both the domestic public and its regional allies. However, it appears that the administration is now trying to build a new foreign policy architecture by opening limited but effective channels of dialogue with Israel and Turkey, rather than remaining solely within the Iran-Russia axis.
The new Syria in the US-Israel axis: Kurds and the Shara Government at the breaking point in the Middle East
The shifting balances in the Middle East have brought Syria to a geopolitical breaking point.
Dr. Deniz Çifçi completed his master’s degree in “Theology, Religion, and Philosophy of Religion” and his doctorate in Sociology at Cambridge University. Deniz Çifçi, the key factors that will determine the status of the Kurds in Syria are the conflicts with radical Islamist groups, the stance that some Salafi-jihadist groups within and outside HTŞ will take against Shara, and the new positions assumed by the US and Turkey in this process.
Radical Islamist groups pose a threat to Shara
The new Damascus administration led by Ahmed al-Shara is engaged in both ideological and power-based competition with some Salafi-jihadist groups within the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) coalition. Radical elements within HTŞ—especially foreign fighters—criticize Shara’s close relations with the US and his approach to Israel, arguing that the regime to be established in Syria must be based entirely on Sharia law.
Western countries, on the other hand, expect Shara to push these groups—especially foreign militants—outside the system. However, according to Dr. Çifçi, Shara does not currently have the power to fight these structures directly. Therefore, instead of excluding them, he is trying to integrate them into the army and the administration.
“These groups also have the potential to overthrow Shara in the future. They could establish new structures, as ISIS did in the past,” says Dr. Çifçi.
Sectarian attacks against Alawites and Druze
Researcher Dr. Deniz Çifçi emphasizes that these extreme Salafi-jihadist groups are also behind the massacres against Alawites.
He points out that foreign militants play a major role in sectarian attacks:
“It is not impossible that these massacres were carried out independently of Shara. However, the fact that these attacks are still continuing, especially in the face of reactions from the West, shows that Shara is no longer able to control some groups. Some structures within HTŞ do not fully submit to Shara. Of course, when I say this, I am not saying that there is no sectarian ideology or hostility towards Alevis/Shiites in Shara. Shara himself shares the same ideology and values as other Salafi-jihadist groups to a large extent. Shara is currently acting purely pragmatically and differs from other Salafi-jihadist groups in terms of method (menhej) and, especially, timing.
Similarly, Çifçi points out that the attacks on the Druze also came from the same circles, stating that these actions are both a partial challenge to Şara and a clear manifestation of sectarian hatred.
ISIS and old scores
According to Çifçi, Syria’s stability is too fragile to be achieved solely through international recognition and the lifting of sanctions. This is because it remains unclear how foreign fighters within HTŞ will behave towards Shara or to what extent Shara will be able to control these groups.
The stance of ISIS cells still active in Syria is also an important factor affecting this equation. Dr. Çifçi emphasizes the historical reckoning between Shara and ISIS:
“In 2013–2014, when Shara (then known as Mohammad al-Colani) pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda rather than ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, this decision led to a bloody war between the Al-Nusra Front, led by Colani, and ISIS. Therefore, I believe that ISIS still harbors a deep-seated enmity toward Şara from the past.”
Today, ISIS cells that are still dormant or partially active in Syria could reactivate and plunge the country into serious instability. Ideological and political conflicts between Islamist groups have the potential to affect not only Shara’s rule but also the entire Syria and the political balance of the entire region through Syria.
Deniz Çifçi continued his remarks as follows:
“The war or ‘jihad,’ as they call it, launched by Salafi-jihadist groups against the forces that came to power as a result of regime change has always led to serious instability in these countries. For example, after the US invasion of Iraq, the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi group, which was officially linked to Al-Qaeda but operated quite independently from Al-Qaeda’s central command, dragged Iraq into a sectarian conflict between 2004 and 2006. Iraq was pushed into a civil war based on Sunni-Shia sectarianism. The US and its international and local partners did not stop this civil war for a long time. Tens of thousands of civilians and security personnel lost their lives. Al-Zarkawi’s group later laid important ideological and organizational groundwork for the formation of ISIS. Similarly, the Taliban government, which has been in power in Afghanistan since 2021, is now facing difficulties due to attacks carried out by the ISIS-Khorasan, an extremist Salafi-jihadist group, at the local and regional levels.
If the ISIS-Khorasan group targets the Taliban government for ideological and political reasons and carries out serious attacks that will put Kabul in a difficult position, a similar situation—conflict between different Islamist groups—could be repeated in Syria. For ideological and political reasons, some HTŞ components may also rebel against Shara. The Shara government does not yet have the military power to fully combat these structures. Shara does not have a strong military force like the Taliban, and the political and economic support of the West and regional countries may not be sufficient to ensure stability in Syria.
If Shara is overthrown or enters into an internal conflict with some Islamist groups, Syria will be plunged into instability that will significantly affect regional geopolitical balances. The problem is that, at present, there is no serious alternative to Shara in Syria.
“The political and military power balances that have shaped Syria’s ethnic and sectarian structure up to the present day have prevented the development of serious political relations and alliances between Kurds, Alawites, Druze, and some Sunni opposition groups before and after the Assad era.” For this reason, Dr. Çifçi emphasizes that there is no strong opposition bloc in Syria, as there is in Iraq: Çifçi emphasizes that there is no strong opposition bloc in Syria, as there is in Iraq: “For example, after Saddam, the Kurds, Shiites, Turkmen, some Christian groups, and some Sunnis were able to form a bloc in Iraq.
These groups held various meetings and conferences in 1992 (Vienna), 1993 (Iraqi Kurdistan Region), and 2002 (London), with Ahmet Çelebi present in the country, and reached agreements on many issues, primarily federalism, regarding the future of Iraq. There was an organized resistance against Saddam. Unfortunately, such an alliance did not develop to the same extent in Syria.
New Syria caught between balances
The new administration established in Damascus after Assad is trying to stay afloat with external support and temporary compromises. However, Ahmed al-Shara’s Salafi-jihadist structures are testing the stability of the Shara administration. The uncertain political leanings of these groups are making the existing balances even more fragile. However, the Salafi-jihadist structures around Ahmed al-Shara are testing the stability of the Shara administration. The uncertain political orientation of these groups is making the existing balance even more fragile.
Rojava is now a center where not only the Kurds but also actors such as Turkey, the US, Israel, Iran, and Russia are directly involved. However, the lack of clarity in the political process (although the Kurds have recently formed a joint delegation to negotiate with Damascus, the outcome of these negotiations is still unclear) and the absence of legal mechanisms to enforce international objectives put the Kurds’ security at risk. However, the lack of clarity in political objectives (although in the recent process the Kurds have not yet been able to form a joint delegation to negotiate with Damascus) and the absence of an international legal status for the Kurds’ political aspirations are putting their protection at risk.
The declining US military presence, the EU’s migrant market with Turkey, and Israel’s regional calculations are increasing external pressure on Rojava. Damascus’ centralised administration and Shara’s limited room for manoeuvre are leading to a temporary balance rather than a long-term solution. The US’s declining military presence, the EU’s migrant market with Turkey and Israel’s regional calculations are increasing external pressure on Rojava. Damascus’ centralised administration and Shara’s limited room for manoeuvre are leading to temporary balance models rather than a long-term solution.
If Salafi-jihadist radical groups are not brought under control, and the Kurds cannot establish a clear political path and transform into an internationally sustainable structure, a new chaos in Syria is expected to become inevitable. The structure that has been established is still more fragile than stable. If radical groups cannot be brought under control, the Kurds cannot establish a clear political path, and an internationally supported structure cannot be established, a new transformation into chaos in Syria will be inevitable. The structure that has been established is still more fragile than stable.
